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Abstract 
In our previous articles, we have explained the distortions from the isolated implementation of corporate taxes 
on company’s investment, a condition that assumes total abstraction of the personal taxes. In this article, we 
included the personal taxes in our analysis, with intention to explore the investment decision from the 
shareholder’s point of view as well. With other words, the goal of this serial of  articles is to analyze the effects 
from the integrated implementation of both, the corporate and the personal taxes, a phenomenon commonly 
referred as “double taxation”. For that purpose, our basic methodology of effective marginal tax rates is once 
again modified and extended to express all the newly occurred conditions. The theory refers to many varieties of 
integrated tax systems that carry some capacities to alleviate the burden targeted exclusively on the external 
equity investments. From the wide literature, in our two previous articles we narrowed our choice to examine 
the proposals of the OECD, which included the Comprehensive Business Income Tax system (CBIT), the 
Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax system (ACE), and the Allowance for Shareholder Equity Tax system 
(ASE). In this article, we focus our attention specifically on the Full Integration Tax system (FIT), the Dividend 
Exemption Tax system (DET) and the Flat Tax Rate system (FTR). 
Keywords: Full Integration Tax system (FIT); Dividend Exemption Tax system (DET); Flat Tax Rate system 
(FTR); cost of capital; effective marginal tax rate; Classical Corporation Tax (CCT); debt; new equity issues; 
double taxation. 
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1. Introduction 
In our previous articles, we have described and explained the distortions that usually arise from the isolated 
implementation of corporate taxes, a condition that assumes total abstraction of the personal taxes. In this 
article, we also include the personal taxes in our analysis, with intention to explore the investment decision, not 
only from the company’s perspective, but from the shareholder’s point of view as well. With other words, the 
goal is to analyze the effect from the integrated implementation of both, the corporate and the personal taxes, a 
phenomenon commonly referred as “double taxation”. This condition is granted to fact that the corporate tax 
base (i.e. the corporate income) cannot be limited only at the corporation observed as a form of legal entity. 
Usually, under the Classical Corporation Tax regime, after the initial taxation at corporate level, corporate 
profits are distributed to the shareholders in a form of dividends, capital gains or interest payments, and are 
subject to additional taxation at personal level. The ultimate consequence of the referred phenomenon is 
imposition of an additional “extra” burden on total corporate profit expressed integrally from its source to its 
destination. Taking in consideration that this “excessive” taxation of profit which is considered unfair and could 
distort the economic activity of firms, the authorities try to construct more appropriate “neutral” tax systems 
with attributions to effectively tax the economic rents (or the extra profit) and at the same time avoid taxation of 
the normal return. In addition, we give a brief literature review to some integrated models of corporate tax 
systems with the desired properties (capacity to alleviate the extra burden on corporate profits and higher degree 
of neutrality). The following tax systems are protagonists proposals of the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development), as a part of the tax reform that was undergone recently. According to the 
OECD (2007), the following tax systems are considered as neutral with abilities to eliminate the difference 
between debt and equity. Which in other hand are associated with the classical corporation tax: the Full 
Integration Tax system (FIT), the Dividend Exemption Tax system (DET), the Allowance for Corporate Equity 
tax system (ACE), the Allowance for Shareholder Equity tax system (ASE), the Comprehensive Business 
Income Tax (CBIT) etc.  It is a commonly known truth that borrowed capital is a superior source of finance 
from the taxpayer’s point of view, because of the usual and widely excepted treatment of interest payments. In 
practice, since companies are allowed to deduct interest payments from their corporate income tax base, the 
system subsidizes the debt source finance in a manner that the action reduces the opportunity cost of the debt-
financed investment. This gives a certain advantage to the debt finance, since it is considered as tax preferred in 
front of equity, which oppositely is fully taxed. The last triggers unfavorable behavior of the company, to use 
more borrowed capital, thus increasing the risk of bankruptcy and insolvency of the firm. The last presents the 
most common and typical distortion of the corporate finance, induced by the traditional, “classical” treatment of 
corporate profit. But, the leading economic organizations such as the OECD, have made a break-through in the 
sphere of business taxation, proposing some alternative models of hybrid tax systems, that are much or less 
distinct from the classical approach and have better capacities to allocate the burden across the different sources 
of finance more evenly. For example, the FIT system treats the corporation as a pass through entity and allocates 
all the corporate profit at shareholder level, where it is subject to taxation under the personal income tax. For the 
CIT already paid on distributed profits, the stockholders will be granted with a tax credit in amount of the tax 
liabilities paid at corporate level. As a result, tax treatment between debt and equity will be ultimately equalized. 
Another great example is the CBIT system. This regime successfully eliminates the need for integration between 
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the corporate and personal taxes on equity by imposing restriction on the possibility to deduct the interest 
payments. In fact, interest income is no longer deductible from the corporate income tax base and at the same 
time is exempt from taxation at personal level. The result is neutrality and indifference between debt and equity. 
Also, the ACE system represents an appropriate solution against the induced distortion on the corporate finance. 
With the ACE system, companies are allowed to deduct a normal return on equity from the corporate income tax 
base, which is usually equal to the nominal interest rate, providing an equal, parallel „symmetric“ treatment of  
debt and equity. Differently to the ACE, the ASE allows to the entity to deduct a tax-deductible allowance for 
the normal return, this time on the shareholder capital income tax base, not on the corporate income tax base, 
thus establishing neutrality among the alternative finance. Similar effects are determined within the other tax 
systems mentioned above (OECD, 2007).  In this article, we focus our attention specifically on the integrated 
effects from corporate and personal taxes on company’s investment financed exclusively with new equity issues 
(external equity). As we know from business practice, equities could be found in 2 (two) fundamental forms: 
external equity (new equity issues), which provides the equity capital for the ongoing projects externally, 
through issues of the company’s shares on the capital market; and retained earnings (retentions of profit), which 
are formed from the company’s accumulated (non-distributed) profit and are usually subject of reinvestment. 
The models of taxation discussed in this article, could be easily applied in the investment scenario covered with 
retained earnings as well, of course modified with its specific circumstances. With the purpose to achieve more 
detailed, systematic approach in exploration of the attributions and specificities of the models, we decided to 
study them separately, and dedicate this article only for the new equity finance. Other reasons for this are the 
limited space, minimizing the risk for confusion, and providing a better comparison of the effects. The basic 
methodology is consisted of the effective marginal tax rates analytical frame (EMTR), which is additionally 
modified and extended to express all the newly occurred conditions that define “double” taxation of corporate 
profit. With the adapted methodology of EMTR, we have managed to identify and explain many varieties of 
integrated tax systems. Here, we present in detail the effects from the Full Integration Tax system (FIT), 
Dividend Integration Tax system (DET) and the Flat Tax Rate system (FTR), as the other models of integrated 
systems are already examined in our previous articles. 
2. Altering the basic methodological frame  
We already mentioned, preferably, that the measurements should be expressed at marginal level, because the 
focus of this research is put on the allocation criteria. Here, the main purpose is to examine the investment 
decision in the case of integrated implementation of both, the corporate and the personal taxes. For that reason, 
the basic methodology of effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), has to be modified once again, because of its 
capabilities to capture the integrated effect from these taxes. To recall, according to Devereux & Griffith [1,2,3], 
the effective marginal tax rate is defined as: 
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In order to isolate the pure effects, that arise from the imposition of the code, as well as to simplify the 
calculation for the purpose of a better illustration of the effects, once again, we suggest the following 
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assumptions: the net-present value of depreciation allowances is assumed 0 (A = 0), there is no inflation in the 
economy (π = 0, ρ = r), the rate of economic depreciation is assumed 0 (δ = 0) and the real interest rate is 
positive (r > 0). If we consider the previous assumptions and label md as the personal tax rate on dividend 
income, z as the effective personal tax rate on capital gains, mi as the personal tax rate on interest income and c 
as the tax credit rate allowed for dividends paid, and then the tax discrimination variable requires the form of: 
)1)(1(
)1(
cz
md
−−
−
=γ           (2) 
The shareholder’s discount rate transforms to: 
r
z
mi






−
−
=
1
1ρ           (3)
 
And the general form of cost of capital rearranges to: 
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Recognizing the fact that under existence of personal taxes, the financial constraints variable FNE when the 
project is financed with new equities is measured as: 
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Derives a cost of capital for this alternative investment of: 
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While under the same conditions, the financial constraints variable FDE when the project is financed with debt: 
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Generates a cost of capital for the debt-financed investment of: 
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Before we proceed, we would like to refer to our main analytical tool, and that is, the investment tax wedge 
coefficient defined as (p~ – r).  Depending on the relation between the cost of capital p~ and the real interest rate 
r, we can distinct three different conditions. The first condition is when the effective tax burden is positive (p~> 
r) and because of that, the tax system depresses the investment activities. In terms of integrated taxation of 
company‘s income, this means that both, the economic rent and the normal return are effectively taxed. The 
second condition is when the effective tax burden is equal to 0 (p~ = r), when the tax system is neutral to the 
investment decision. In other words, under these conditions, the normal return of corporate profit is left from 
taxation and only the extra profit is being subject to taxation. In addition, the third and the most preferable 
condition from the investor’s point of view is when the effective tax burden is negative (p~< r), when the tax 
system supports the overall investment. Here, the investment is being effectively „subsidized“by the system, 
enabling the investor to legally escape from taxation a rate of return higher than the normal rate of return. In 
perfect economies without presence of taxes, the cost of capital is identical with the real interest rate (p~= r) and 
the economic agents are completely indifferent between the investment decision and the decision to save. 
Normally, the existence of national tax system diverges the difference between the cost of capital and the 
interest rate and therefore creates a positive tax wedge (p~> r). 
3. Recalling the classical corporation tax system (CCT) 
Before we move on with the analysis, we would like to recall once again briefly, to the so-called „classical“ 
approach in corporate taxation, which has been traditionally the most used and widely practiced form of 
corporate tax. As stated before, the classical system posts a true representation of what is known as „double“ 
taxation and a classical example of pure separate taxation of corporate income. We remember to it because it 
serves as a baseline model for comparison of the integrated tax systems discussed later in the paper. Actually, 
the CCT is a rudimentary form of corporate tax that treats the corporate income in a conservative and 
fundamental way. It is a taxing system of companies in which the company is treated as a taxable entity, 
separate from its own shareholders. The profits of companies under this system are therefore taxed twice, first 
when made by the company and again when distributed to the shareholders as dividends and capital gains. 
Formally, there is no integration at all between the corporate and personal income tax under the CCT system. In 
the essence of the Classical Corporation Tax is double taxation of corporate income. Such a tax system 
discriminates against the incorporation of business ideas, restrains the supply of equity finance necessary for 
their economic utilization, reallocates resources from the corporate sector to the unincorporated one and thus 
causes an efficiency loss to the whole economy [4]. The need to eliminate these drawbacks led to tax reforms 
aimed at integrating the taxation of corporations and their owners [5]. So, how could we express the true nature 
of this typical form of corporate tax and illustrate the effects from it in terms of the proposed methodology? 
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Technically speaking “A Classical System makes no allowance for “double” taxation, so that dividend income is 
subject to corporate income tax and taxed again as personal income” [6].  The authorities impose the corporate 
tax at the corporate level differently from the personal taxes at the stockholder level and at the same time do not 
allow any tax credit on dividend distributions (c = 0). Usually, the combination of the levels (percentage points) 
of the different tax rates falls under discretion of the policy maker. Considering this, we can identify the CCT 
system as (t, md, mi, z, c = 0). 
3.1. CCT in debt-financed alternatives  
It is easily recognized that the CCT produces a zero investment tax wedge if we take in account expression (8) 
that the cost of capital in this alternative is equal to the real interest rate: 
0~ =−=− rrrp           (9) 
A conclusion is drawn that, if the overall integrated effect from the corporate and the personal tax is observed, in 
every case when the investment project is financed with external debt, the system will be neutral to the 
investment decision, ceteris paribus. The introduction of personal taxes do not affect these investments in a 
different way rather than the case of isolated application of the corporate tax, so it is evident that the „double“ 
taxation effect is not present here. 
3.2. CCT in debt-financed alternatives  
The implications of the conditions of classical system in this alternative is initially found in parameters γ and ρ: 
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Including these in term (6), the cost of capital will become: 
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Finally, the investment tax wedge will transform to: 
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Accordingly, as stated in this case by [7], “The effects from corporate taxation very often depend on the cross-
effects from the personal taxation”. Expression (12) shows that the investment decision in this basic and most 
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extended version of taxation of corporate income is determined largely from the inter-relation between the 
different personal tax rates (mi and md) and the corporate tax rate t. It is also self-evident, as we can see from the 
absence of symbol z, that the effective personal tax rate on capital income is no relevant for the present model of 
taxation. The effect from „double“ taxation is quantified with the term (1 – mi)/(1 – t)(1 – md). Actually, it 
represents the combined corporate and personal income tax liability of the CCT, which may have variable 
values depending on different dimensions of the relevant tax rates imposed by the code. For example, if we take 
the actual situation in Macedonia, where mi = 0% (0,00), md= 10% (0,10) and t = 10% (0,10), the combined tax 
liability would be 0,2345 or 23,34% and with real interest rate of 10% (0,10) would yield an effective tax rate on 
investment of 0,0234 or 2,34%. If we assume that an interest income tax of 5% has been introduced lately mi = 
5% (0,05), than the combined tax liability would be 0,1728 or 17,28%, producing an effective tax rate on 
investment of 0,0172 or 1,72%. On the other hand, if the corporate and the dividend tax are increased on 20% t 
= md= 20% (0,20) and mi= 0% (0,00), it is obvious that the investment tax wedge will additionally increase even 
on 0,0562 or 5,62%. In the following table, some possible combinations of the relevant tax rates and outcomes 
are presented and interpreted in terms of the investment tax wedge coefficient. Of course, the Classical System 
of Corporation Tax could produce in theory some favorable outcomes, despite its infamous reputation. As we 
can see from Table 1, an increase in corporate and dividend tax will generally increase liabilities and the 
burden on investment, while an increase in interest income tax will decrease tax obligations and vice versa. If 
the combined liability of the corporate and the dividend tax from the denominator is higher than the interest tax 
liability from the nominator, the investment tax wedge will be positive, with limiting, distortive effects on the 
equity-financed investment. If this combined liability is equal to the interest tax liability, regardless the level of 
tax rates, the system will be neutral and indifferent concerning the investment decision. A positive burden can 
occur even when the relevant tax rates are identical (t = md = mi), a situation which is else known as „Flat Tax 
Rate system“ (see Raw 2 from Table 1). In addition, in the third option, every time when the combined liability 
is lesser than the nominator, with no respect to the level of tax rates, the system will create favorable conditions, 
stimulating the equity-financed investments trough subsidization of the normal rate of the return. Usually, the 
authorities avoid the last condition in order to escape any additional refunds. The circumstance that sustains a 
positive tax burden actually represents a reflection of what is known as a true CCT system. Therefore, the 
Classical Corporation Tax assumes a positive (non-zero) tax rates with a corporate income and a dividend 
income tax equal or higher than the interest income tax and a right to the company to deduct the interest 
payments from its corporate income tax base. 
We may conclude that the CCT, as we know it, produces in total, the highest amount of taxes paid on a single 
unit of corporate profit, entails double taxation, and possess a large distortive potential on corporate finance. 
However, as mentioned, only if the interest payments are being continuously deductible from the tax base and 
the tax rates met with the appropriate specifications. Under the conditions of Classical System, the normal return 
and the extra profit at its source and its destination are effectively streamed by the means of taxing regime. 
However, if we put aside these limitations, certain advantages open some new frontiers and possibilities for the 
CCT. For instance, the incorporated principle of CCT for separate and independent taxation of company’s 
income enables the corporate tax from the first stage to act as a withholding barrier for the personal taxes 
imposed in the second stage. Another positive attribution is the simple tax structure. The CCT’s in-build 
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simplicity without any complex rules for exempting flow-troughs of capital income raised the idea for the 
Classical Corporation Tax as a global mean of tax harmonization in an international context. These present only 
a handful of the positive features of CCT acknowledged from the literature [8]. 
Table 1: Illustration of the possible combinations of tax rates and their effects on investment under the CCT 
system 
Possible 
combination 
of tax rates 
Example Investment 
tax wedge 
 (p~-r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
investment 
Effects on 
normal return 
and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t = md = mi 10%,10%,10% 1,11% limiting normal return 
and rent  
taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md = mi 20%,10%,10% 2,50% limiting normal return 
and rent  
taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md> mi 30%,20%,10% 6,07% limiting normal return 
and rent  
taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md< mi 20%,10%,28% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t > md< mi 10%,  5%,30% -1,81% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t = md> mi 20%,20%, 
10% 
4,06% limiting normal return 
and rent  
taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t = md< mi 10%,10%,19% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = md< mi 10%,10%,30% -1,36% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t = md = 0,mi 0%, 0%, 10% -1,00% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t = md, mi= 0 10%,10%, 0% 2,34% limiting normal return 
and rent  
taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t = mi, md= 0 10%,10%, 0% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = 0, mi=md 0%,10%, 10% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = md=mi= 0 0%,  0%,  0% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
4. Full integration tax system (FIT) 
Sometimes, in order to alleviate the corporate’s tax burden to some extent, the tax authorities might allow a tax 
credit on dividend distributions at the personal (shareholder) level in amount of the liabilities paid at corporate 
level (c = t). The repercussions from this measure, which is called with other words „Full Imputation 
(Integration) Tax system - FIT“, to variables γ and ρ are the following: 
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to the cost of capital: 
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and to the investment tax wedge: 
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As we can see from the absence of symbol t above, with this approach we have managed to neutralize the effect 
from the corporate income tax in whole. The corporation acts as a pass through entity and all the corporate 
profits are allocated at shareholder level, where it is subject to taxation under the personal income tax. The 
system produces preferences that depend in general only from the personal taxes involved in this particular 
model of taxation: the personal tax rate on dividend income md and the personal tax rate on interest income mi. 
Note that if md= mi, than the tax burden is zero, equalizing the tax treatment between debt and new equity issues. 
There is even an extreme case of negative tax burden, only possible if md<mi, turning the table in favor of this 
finance compared to debt, which is traditionally thought as the most tax favorable source of finance. In practice, 
Macedonia experienced this model of corporate taxation until the end of 2006, when a priority was given to the 
development of the stock market, supported with adequate tax measures. Companies were “encouraged” to 
participate in the market with implementation of the imputation corporate tax system. In fact, the Macedonian 
model was not a FIT system, but rather a Partly Integrated Tax system (PIT). A partial tax credit on dividend 
distributions in amount of 50% of the corporate income tax liability was allowed to the entitled companies for 
stimulation of the stock exchange. For example, the factual tax rates mi = 0% (0,00) and md= 10% (0,10) under 
the conditions of the former PIT system would produce a tax liability of 0,1696 (1 – mi)/(1 – c)(1 – md) = (1 – 
0)/(1 – 0,05)(1 – 0,10) or 16,96%, and with interest rate of 10% an effective tax rate of 0,0169 (1,69%). For 
comparison, if we assume the propositions of the FIT instead of the PIT system, and implement the same rates, 
the results show that the difference in the burden is apparently evident: tax liability of 11,11% and an investment 
tax wedge of 1,11%.  
If the goal is to achieve neutrality in taxation, the Macedonian authorities should set identical personal income 
tax rates (mi = md). Therefore, if mi = 10% (0,10) and md= 10% (0,10), that would result with zero percent (0%) 
tax liability and zero percent tax wedge, which is completely identical with the scenario of the debt financed 
investment. 
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Table 2: Illustration of the possible effects of FIT on investment 
FIT 
variants 
Example Invest-
ment tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –financed 
invest-ment 
Effects on 
normal return 
and economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi = 
md, c = t 
10%, 
10%, 10% 
0,00% indifferent rent tax only indifferent neutral 
t, mi  > 
md, c = t 
10%, 
20%, 10% 
-1,11% stimulating subsidized favors equity distortive 
t, mi < 
md,  c = t 
10%, 
10%,  
20% 
1,25% limiting normal return 
and rent  taxed  
favors debt distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
5. Dividend exemption tax system (DET) 
Another famous measure used for alleviation of the corporate tax burden for investments financed with external 
equity is the so-called „Dividend Exemption Tax system - DET“. A similar form, proposed by Cnossen [9], is 
the dividend deduction tax system (the dividend relief system) which incorporates certain deductions on the 
company’s or alternatively, the shareholder’s capital income tax base. In our case, rather than deduction, the 
relief is more in a form of exemption exclusively on the shareholder’s capital income tax base. Technically 
speaking, with this measure tax authorities actually allow a full exemption from personal tax on the received 
dividend income by every shareholder in the corporation (md = 0). 
5.1. DET system with no tax credit available (c = 0) 
First we will analyze the scenario of the dividend exemption system if there is no additional tax credit available 
(c = 0). If the conditions are as mentioned, than the implications for γ and ρ are the following: 
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for the cost of capital from term (11), the implications are: 
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and for the investment tax wedge (expression 11): 
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The result from term (18), explains that in case of investment covered with new equity issues, the dividend 
exemption system creates a wedge that mostly depends from the relation of the corporate tax rate t and the 
personal tax rate on interest income mi. Differently to the FIT, this system effectively removes the effect from 
the personal tax on dividend income in general, rather than the effect from the corporate income tax (residence 
based tax). Similarly, three (three) conditions can be identified here: first, the condition of positive taxation on 
corporate income when t >mi (favors debt source investment); second, the condition of a neutral taxation when t 
= mi (equalizes the treatment between debt and equity); and third, the condition of negative burden on corporate 
income when t <mi (which favors equity source investment). As we can see, to achieve neutrality, this system 
demands equalization of the corporate income tax rate and the personal tax rate on interest income. 
Table 3: Illustration of the possible effects of DET (with no tax credit available) on investment 
DET 
variants 
Example Invest-
ment tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –financed 
invest-ment 
Effects on 
normal return 
and economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t = mi, md 
= 0, c = 0 
10%, 
10%, 0% 
0,00% indifferent rent tax only indifferent neutral 
t > mi, md 
= 0, c = 0 
20%, 
10%, 0% 
1,25% limiting normal return 
and rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t < mi, md 
= 0,  c = 
0 
10%, 
20%, 0% 
-1,11% stimulating subsidized favors equity distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
Let’s incorporate the previous model fictionary on the domestic tax parameters mi = 0% (0,00) and md= 10% 
(0,10). The implementation of the DET system would have produced tax liability of 0,1111(1 – mi)/(1 – t) = (1 – 
0)/(1 – 0,10) or 11,11%, and with interest rate of 10% an effective tax rate of 0,0111 (1,11%). According to this, 
the effect from this system is similar to the effect from the FIT system, but only coincidently because the 
corporate income tax rate t is the same as the dividend income tax rate md. If they were different, say t = 20% 
(0,20) and md= 10% (0,10), the effect from the FIT would not change, but the effect from the DET system 
would be significantly different generating tax liability of 0,25 (1 – mi)/(1 – t) = (1 – 0)/(1 – 0,20) or 25%, and 
an effective tax rate of 0,025 (2,5%). 
5.2. DET system with tax credit available (c = t) 
In this section, we investigate the effect from the implementation of the DET system with a tax credit available 
on dividend distributions. This model represents an extreme form of integrated taxation where both of the 
effects created by the corporate tax and the dividend tax directly cancel each other, creating a negative tax 
wedge on the capital income. If these assumptions are met, than variables γ and ρ will become: 
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the cost of capital from term (19) will transform to: 
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and the investment tax wedge from expression [22]: 
iii rmrrmrrrmrp −=−−=−−=− )1(~       (21) 
The negative prefix from expression (21), clearly demonstrates that this combination generates strong incentives 
for the investments covered with equities, but only in presence of positive tax rate on interest income. If this 
condition is satisfied, as in the case of many countries, the “tax subsidization” is proportional to the multiplied 
value of the real interest rate r and the personal tax rate on interest income mi, automatically creating advantages 
to new equity in front of debt. But if the national code does not incorporate a personal tax rate paid on interest 
income, such as in the case of Macedonia, than the described effect of tax subsidization will diminish, and the 
system will remain neutral between the alternative sources of finance (mi = 0, r = 0,10 and p~ - r = -0,10 x 0,00 
= 0). 
Table 4: Illustration of the possible effects of DET (with tax credit available) on investment 
DET 
variants 
Example Invest-
ment tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –financed 
invest-ment 
Effects on 
normal return 
and economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi, md = 
0, c = t 
10%, 
10%, 0% 
-1,00% stimulating subsidized favors equity distortive 
t, mi = 0, 
md= 0, c 
= t 
10%, 0%, 
0% 
0,00% indifferent rent taxed only indifferent neutral 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
6. Flat Tax Rate System (FTR) 
The next variant of integrated taxation offers another intresting feature for neutralization of the effects from 
„double“ taxation. It is the so-called Flat Tax Rate system - FTR, which requires implementation of „flat“, 
proportional tax rates on the corporate income and the personal income tax base (mi = md = z = t). 
6.1. FTR system with no tax credit available (c = 0) 
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First, the model of flat tax rate system without a tax credit is presented, whose conditions require for the 
variables γ and ρ to obtain values of: 
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the cost of capital p~ value of: 
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and the investment tax wedge p~ – r value of: 
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As it is seen from our previous articles, the result of this calculation is the same as the one for the CBIT system 
with no tax credit available, but only arbitraged against the form of this expression, not actually against the 
ultimate effect on the investment. Namely, the system of CBIT assumes that the interest rate is not deductible 
from the tax base when the investment is financed with debt, on the contrary of the FTR system, which means 
that in essence, their overall allocation criteria is different as presented in the tables bellow. 
Table 5: Illustration of the possible effects of FTR (without tax credit available) on investment 
FTR 
Variant 
Example Invest-
ment tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-ment 
Effects on 
normal return 
and economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t = mi = 
md, c = 0 
10%, 
10%, 10% 
1,11% limiting normal return 
and rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
6.2. FTR system with tax credit available (c = t) 
The same conclusion can be drawn for the next variant, as well, but from the view of the urge for equalization of 
the different treatments. Again, it is about the Flat Tax Rate system, but with available tax credit on dividend 
distributions. The implications of this variant on the tax discrimination variable γ and the shareholders discount 
rate ρ are the following: 
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Finally, to the investment tax wedge p~ – r: 
0~ =−=− rrrp           (27) 
Table 6: Illustration of the possible effects of CBIT (with no tax credit available) on investment 
CBIT 
Variants 
Example Invest-
ment tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-ment 
Effects on 
normal return 
and economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi = 0, 
md = 0, c 
= 0 
10%, 0%, 
0% 
1,11% limiting normal return 
and rent  taxed 
indifferent neutral 
t, mi = md≠ 
0, c = 0 
10%, 
20%, 20% 
1,11% limiting normal return 
and rent  taxed 
indifferent neutral 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
We immediately recognize similarity between this result and the one from the CBIT system with a tax credit 
available, but the effects on corporate finance and the allocation criteria are quite distinctive. Since under these 
conditions the value of investment tax wedge is zero, the excess of the corporate tax burden in this financial 
alternative is effectively eliminated, creating indifferent position for investment and saving, just the same as in 
the case of debt financed investment. To conclude, if the imperative is neutrality, then the condition of c = t 
must be fully respected for the purpose within the FTR system. At the end of this section, we would like to clear 
some confusing facts concerning the FTR system. Namely, from the previous we noticed that the basic model of 
this system creates a positive wedge on a unit of taxable profit, which means that fundamentally, it is not a 
“perfectly“ neutral tax model.  
Table 7: Illustration of the possible effects of FTR (with tax credit available) on investment 
FTR 
Variant 
Example Invest-
ment tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –financed 
invest-ment 
Effects on 
normal return 
and economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t = mi = 
md, c = t 
10%, 
10%, 10% 
0,00% indifferent  rent  taxed only indifferent neutral 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
We also said that to respect the principle of neutrality, the condition of c = t had to be satisfied. Following this, 
we could easily conclude that on the contrary, the FTR system is not actually „flat“ or „neutral“ as it seems. 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2018) Volume 42, No  4, pp 203-219 
217 
 
Truthfully, the expression „flat“ is synonymous terminology widely excepted by the public that refers not to the 
concept of „neutrality“, but to concept of „equality“ or „proportionality“ among the different tax rates. In the 
following tables, for a better illustration, we summarize the derived effects from taxation on investment 
performance according to the observed FRT and CBIT models. 
Table 8: Illustration of the possible effects of CBIT (with tax credit available) on investment 
CBIT 
Variants 
Example Invest-
ment tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed invest-
ment 
Effects on 
normal return 
and economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi = 0, 
md = 0, c 
= t 
10%, 0%,  
0% 
0,00% indifferent rent  taxed only favors equity distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
7. Conclusion 
At the finishing point, the effects from taxation on investment performance are summarized in Table 9, and the 
qualitative attributions of the analyzed basic models are given in Table 10. 
Table 9: Summary of the effects from taxation on investment performance 
Classical Corporation Income Tax System (CCT)  
Debt 0
 
New equity issues: (t, mi, md, z, c = 0) 



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−−
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Full Integration tax System (FIT)  
Debt 0 
New equity issues: (t, mi, md, c = t) 






−
−
− 1
)1(
)1(
d
i
m
mr  
Dividend Exemption Tax System (DET)  
Debt 0 
New equity issues: Basic model, without tax credit available (t, mi, md = 0, c = 
0) 



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
−
−
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New equity issues: Model of DET with tax credit available (t, mi, md = 0, c = t) irm−
 Flat Tax Rate System (FTR)  
Debt 0 
New equity issues: Basic model, without tax credit available (t = mi = md, c = 0) 
)1( t
rt
−  
New equity issues: Model of FRT with tax credit available (t = mi = md, c = t) 0 
Source: Summary and review of author’s calculations 
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Table 10: Summary of the qualitative attributions of basic tax models (aspect of taxation of new equity issues) 
Basic 
model 
of tax 
system 
Effects on 
debt  
finance 
Effects on 
new equity 
finance 
Effects 
on 
econo-
mic 
rent 
Effects 
on 
normal 
return 
Withhold-
ing function 
criteria 
Location 
 specific 
criteria 
Overall 
allocation  
criteria 
 
 (CCT) 
 
favors 
( in general) 
 
discriminates 
(in general) 
 
Taxed 
 
taxed 
withholds 
rents and 
normal 
return 
source & 
resi-
dence-
based 
 
distortive 
 
(CBIT) 
 
neutral 
(predominan-
tly) 
 
neutral 
(predominan-
tly) 
 
Taxed 
 
taxed 
no 
withholding 
function at 
all 
 
source- 
based 
 
neutral 
(FIT) discriminates 
or neutral 
 (in most 
cases) 
 
favors or 
neutral 
(in most 
cases) 
Taxed exempt withholds 
rents 
residen-ce 
based 
distortive 
(DET) discriminates 
or neutral 
(mostly) 
favors or 
neutral 
(mostly) 
Taxed exempt withholds 
rents 
source 
and resi-
dence 
based 
distortive 
(FTR) favors 
(predominan-
tly) 
 
discriminates 
(predominan-
tly) 
Taxed taxed withholds 
rents and 
normal 
return 
source 
and resi-
dence 
based 
distortive 
Source: Author’s interpretations 
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